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Abstract
We present a model with intergenerational transmission of preferences providing a joint
explanation of preference evolution and of work organization changes in a society. We focus
on the preference for autonomy, defined as an individual’s degree of initiative and the value
they attach to self direction. We show that the economy has several steady states with
different levels of worker autonomy and of the degree of coercion in the work place. The
Industrial Revolution and the recent return of flexible forms of organization enable us to
illustrate the existence of organizational path dependency. Indeed, the current technological
shocks, impacting on the long-run distribution of preferences, modify the future possibilities
of adoption of new organizational forms.
Résumé
Nous proposons d’expliquer conjointement l’évolution des préférences des travailleurs et
les changements dans l’organisation du travail. Pour cela, nous présentons un modèle dans
lequel le degré de préférence pour l’autonomie des agents est hétérogène et se transmet d’une
génération à l’autre. Nous montrons l’existence de plusieurs états stationnaires caractérisés
par des niveaux différents d’autonomie chez le travailleurs et de discipline dans l’organisation
du travail. Les exemples historiques de la Révolution Industrielle et de l’apparition récente de
nouvelles formes d’organisation nous fournissent l’illustration de la propriété de dépendance
à l’histoire dans la trajectoire organisationnelle d’un pays. En effet, un choc technologique
donné, en transformant sur le long terme la structure des préférences, modifiera les possibil-
ités future d’adoption d’une nouvelle forme d’organisation.
JEL Codes: L16, L23, Z10.
Keywords: Cultural Transmission, Work Organization, Industrial Revolution, Histori-
cal Path Dependency.
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1 Introduction
The Industrial Revolution is associated with the rise of the Factory. However, the Factory
cannot be limited to a technological improvement allowing a reduction of production costs
by taking advantage of economies of scale and the fall of transport costs. It is also char-
acterized by a transformation in the relationship between employers, workers and the work
process. Marx (1976)[1867] considers the transition from traditional forms of production
(workshop, handcraft...) to the Factory as a loss of workers’ control over the content, in-
tensity and rhythm of their work.1 This point of view is now held by many economists and
economic historians.2 Yet the Factory’s supremacy is contested, as dramatic changes in the
organization of work occurred at the end of the twentieth century. As distinct from earlier
transformations, recent developments are characterized by a trend toward more autonomy
for the workers. Although this trend, initiated in Japan during the 1970’s, seems to con-
cern most of the industrialized world, the speed and depth of changes vary widely across
countries.
Starting from these observed developments, two opposed traditional explanations emerge.
On the one hand, a cultural explanation (Dore (1973), Lincoln & Kalleberg (1990)) suggests
that the organizational choice derives from the country’s own cultural factors. However, this
view fails to explain the successful implementation of the Japanese style of management into
other countries. Moreover, it considers the culture as a static factor without taking into
account the impact of the industrial structure on the national culture. On the other hand,
a strict technological explanation highlights, for a given technological level, the existence of
a one best way in organizational choices (Kenney & Florida (1993), Kochan et al. (1997)).
However, this approach, by rejecting the influence of national specificities, does not explain
why new organizations can appear at different times and places. The present paper intends
to provide a new understanding of organizational evolution by putting together the cultural
with the economic and technological analysis. Indeed, we argue that transformations of the
workplace induce changes in worker preferences, while the opportunities to adopt a new
organization depend on these preferences.
In an overlapping generations model, we focus on the preference for autonomy. Workers
can be of two types : autonomous or non-autonomous . The utility of an autonomous agent
is assumed to be positively related to the degree of freedom in his work place.3 Conversely, a
non-autonomous agent will be unaffected by the degree of control and the absence of freedom.
Thus, the autonomous workers make a greater effort in a relatively free form of organization
than in a more coercive form. As a consequence, the profitability of each organization
depends on the proportion of autonomous agents in the population. This relation between
work context and incentives to provide effort has been highlighted by Bowles (1998) and
Bowles et al. (2001). They argue that some preferences are incentives-enhancing i.e. they
enable the employer to elicit workers’ effort at lower cost. Moreover, the incentives-enhancing
preferences differ according to the work context, the level in the hierarchy and the level of
1On this lost of control Marx (1976)[1867] writes : “In handcraft [...] the workman makes use of a tool,
in the Factory the machine makes use of him”. (p.422).
2See Berg (1985) for a survey on the economic historians’ views about the passage to the Factory.
3This degree of freedom depends on the level of transfer of decision making and responsibility to the
worker, the possibility of interaction with other workers and with the hierarchy.
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responsibility. Empirical evidence on the existence of such preferences is provided by a
growing number of studies. They emphasize the impact of preferences or personality traits
on labor market outcomes such as the wage or labor market participation (see Jackson (2006),
Nyhus & Pons (2005), Osborne (2005) and a survey in Bowles (1998)).
Here, we consider endogenous preferences. The mechanism of preferences formation is in
line with Bisin & Verdier (2001). Children’s preferences depend on two levels of socialization:
first vertical, then oblique. The vertical socialization corresponds to a direct parental effort
in terms of education. The parents exhibit a paternalistic altruism (Bisin and Verdier), which
incites them to transmit their own preferences. A costly transmission effort determines the
probability of directly transmitting these preferences. The transmission effort increases with
the adequacy between the expected form of work organization and the behavior correspond-
ing to preference type. For instance, autonomous parents may have less incentive to transmit
their preferences if the dominant form of organization is coercive. The oblique socialization
occurs when the vertical one fails. It corresponds to a matching between the child and a role
model 4, randomly chosen in the population, who transmits his own preferences to the child.
Firms have to choose between two archetypal forms of organization : the Workshop and
the Factory organizations (Clark (1994)). The Workshop is more decentralized and leaves
more responsibilities, more possibilities of involvement in the decision making process to
the worker. The Factory is characterized by more precise and repetitive tasks associated
with the labor division and a stricter work discipline. Due to the effect of work context on
the incentives to provide effort, the optimal choice of organization depends on the workers’
preferences. Moreover, through the mechanism of preference transmission, the parental
choice of socialization depends on the firms’ choice of organization. Thus, we obtain a co-
determination of the distribution of preferences (i.e. proportion of each worker type) and the
industrial structure (i.e. proportion of each organizational form) in the economy. This co-
determination may generate multiple equilibria. They differ by the proportion of autonomous
and are characterized either by the domination of the Workshop, by the domination of the
Factory or by a mixed population of firms. This property implies that two countries having
close initial conditions can follow different trajectories and converge to different long-run
situations.
In this framework, we propose a reappraisal of the above-mentioned changes in work
organization and assess the possibility of organizational path dependency. The adoption of
a more flexible and decentralized form of production during recent decades corresponds,
in the model, to a return to the Workshop organization. It was made possible by some
technological innovations (Caroli & van Reenen (2001), Lindbeck & Snower (2000), Milgrom
& Roberts (1990), Mokyr (2001)) having affected the whole developed world. However, the
model predicts that the effects of this shock depend on the structure of preferences in the
economy where it occurs. Indeed, the decentralized form of organization is more adapted
to the autonomous behavior. Thus, the profitability of the adoption of this organization is
positively related to the proportion of autonomous workers. Now, this proportion depends on
the previous shocks. Taking the Japanese example, we argue that the late industrialization
of Japan has induced a less extensive spread of the Factory and therefore a lower decline
in autonomy than in other developed countries. Because of this later industrialization,
4i.e. someone whose character, life and behavior is taken as a good example to follow.
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the Japanese structure of preferences made the adoption of the new organization easier.
Thus, our approach may provide part of an explanation for the international differences
in organizational trajectories without referring to strict cultural explanations. However, it
recognizes the importance of the workers’ preferences in organizational changes (importance
highlighted by Lindbeck & Snower (1996) and (2000) in a static framework.5)
The last part of our analysis consists in the extension of the basic model. First, we show
that our dynamics can exhibit self-fulfilling beliefs, inducing multiple perfect foresight paths.
These features give a role to ideologies. They could shape both the organizational form and
the distribution of preferences in the long run by providing agents with an image of what
should be the state of a future society. Then, we propose a more realistic description of
the recent changes toward a more decentralized form of organization, modelling the role of
autonomy in the process of learning and innovation.
This article is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model and illustrates it by
the example of the Industrial Revolution. Section 3 focuses on the potential discrepancies
concerning the organizational trajectories and the property of path-dependency. Section 4
analyzes the impact of ideologies on both industrial and cultural structures and the conse-
quences of taking into account the opportunities of learning and innovations. Finally, Section
5 concludes.
2 The Model
We consider two populations, the first constituted of infinitely-lived agents, namely firms ,
the second constituted of short-lived agents, namely workers . Both populations of agents
are distributed according to a continuum with a measure normalized to one. Workers are
risk neutral and live two periods. During childhood they acquire their personality, during
adulthood they are randomly matched with a firm, work and receive a wage.
The population of workers is split into two types of individuals, differing in their degree
of autonomy. The autonomous individuals (giving a high value to autonomy) will be indexed
by a¯ and the non-autonomous (giving a low value to autonomy) will be indexed by a. The
proportion of autonomous workers at a date t is denoted qt.
Firms are risk neutral and maximize the profit function pij = e˜−cj where e˜ is the expected
level of worker’s effort and cj the organizing cost of production. They can choose between
two forms of work organization.6 These alternative organizations differ by the level of control
of the employers on the employees and by the level of autonomy of the employees in their
work. Following the description of the Industrial Revolution provided by some economic
historians (such as Berg (1985) or Clark (1994)), these two archetypal forms of organization
are named the Workshop and the Factory. The Workshop is more decentralized, leaves more
freedom to workers who are less controlled; the Factory is characterized by some more precise
and repetitive tasks due to the division of labor and a more strict work discipline.7
5Under the realistic assumption that more skilled workers are more autonomous (Scott (1981)), the model
conforms also with the studies on the skill-biased organizational change (Caroli & van Reenen (2001)).
6We suppose for simplicity that the form of organization is the only available choice variable of the firm.
7Clark (1994) writes: “One reason that the Industrial Revolution was greeted with hostility by many was its
5
Each date t is divided into two sub-periods 1 and 2 . In period 1 workers choose their
effort level regarding the organization implemented by the firm and their degree of autonomy.
In period 2 firms make their choice of organization for the next date in order to maximize
their expected profit and workers choose the level of education which they invest in their
children’s socialization.
The following of this section examines the short-run equilibrium defined as the effort
choices of workers, the choices of organization of firms and the socialization choices of parents
at a date t .
2.1 Short-run equilibrium
2.1.1 Choice of effort
Workers make their effort choices given the organizational context (chosen by the firms
at the previous date). The set of workers’ effort levels is assumed to be discrete : e =
{e¯, e} with e¯ > e. Moreover, neither this effort level nor the workers’ type is observable by
the employer. In consequence, workers earn the same wage whatever their effort level. This
wage is assumed to be exogenous and equal to wF for the Factory organization and wW for
the Workshop organization.8 The employers supervise the work process and try to detect
the shirkers (workers choosing the low effort level). When a shirker is detected, he is directly
dismissed and is not paid.9. The probability of shirkers’ detection is denoted s¯ and s in
respectively the Factory and Workshop with s¯ > s > 0. Indeed, the Factory allows a better
supervision than an organization giving more freedom and autonomy to workers. Finally,
the choice of e¯ provokes a disutility to workers. D denotes the high effort disutility of
an autonomous worker in the Factory organization context. d represents the high effort
disutility of an a-worker whatever the organization type. We assume that D > d > 0, thus
in a coercive context (the Factory organization) the effort of autonomous workers is very
painful.
The matrix of expected gain for each worker type, given the organizational form, are:
W F
e¯ wW wF −D
e (1− s)wW (1− s¯)wF
W F
e¯ wW − d wF − d
e (1− s)wW (1− s¯)wF
a-worker a-worker
Note that the choice of the low effort level does not induce disutility whatever the type of
worker and the organizational form. Hence, for the autonomous it is not the work context
association with a revolutionary change in the way work life was organized [...] Workers in [the] Workshops
controlled their own hours, work pace and conduct. They took breaks when they wanted and socialized at
work as they wished [...] The second and later change was the imposition on these concentrated workers of
“factory discipline”. With factory discipline the employer dictated when workers worked, their conduct on
the job, and that they steadily attend to their assigned task”.
8This difference between the wages paid inside the Factory and inside the Workshop can be explained by
differences of labor productivity associated with the different organizations.
9Pollard (1963) notes that “dismissal and the threat of dismissal, were in fact the main deterrent instru-
ments of enforcing discipline in the factories”. It will be the only instrument in our model. However, the
level of supervision is not a choice variable but an intrinsic feature of the organizational form.
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which is painful but high effort choice in this context. We make the following assumptions
on the payoff structure :
D > s¯wF > d > swW (1)
Lemma 1 Assume condition (1) holds :
− in the Workshop organization, a¯-workers always choose the level of effort e¯ and a-
workers always choose the level of effort e
− in the Factory organization, a¯-workers always choose the level of effort e and a-workers
always choose the level of effort e¯
Inside the Factory, the level of effort disutility discourages autonomous workers from
choosing the high effort level despite the higher detection risk linked with better control.
Conversely, when a¯-workers enjoy more freedom in the work place (as in the Workshop
organization) they will choose the highest effort level. Concerning the a-workers, their effort
disutility is unaffected by the degree of discipline. Their effort choice will only depend on
the detection probability when they choose to shirk and then on the degree of supervision
in the work place.
Thus, autonomy is an incentive-enhancing preference (Bowles et al. (2001)) in a Work-
shop organization but it is an incentive-weakening preference in a Factory organization.10
2.1.2 Choice of organization
Due to the time of implementation of a production process, the form of organization imple-
mented at the date t must be decided at date t− 1. The effort level and the type of workers
are assumed to be unobservable. By Lemma 1, the benefits of one organization will depend
on the proportion of each worker type. Then, to make their organizational choices, firms
have to form expectations, at date t − 1, on the proportion of autonomous workers of date
t. These expectations are based on qt−1, the current observation. It is assumed that firms
cannot perfectly observe this proportion. They receive only local and partial information on
the workforce’s state of mind. Consequently, firms base their choices only on a biased signal
on qt−1. For simplicity, this signal is assumed to be uniformly distributed among the firms
around the true value of qt−1. Under these assumptions, the expected value of qt, denoted
qst , is qst = qt−1 + ε with ε uniformly distributed on the interval [−ε˜, ε˜].11
At each date t , the problem of the firms is the choice of organization for the date t + 1
such that12
Max
j={W,F}
E(pi) = Max
j={W,F}
[qst e(a¯, j) + (1− qst )e(a, j)− cj] (2)
10Pollard (1963) stresses that, according to Factory managers at the beginning of industrialization, a
proportion of workers was considerably dissatisfied because of the absence of autonomy in work organization.
Moreover, this dissatisfaction seems often to induce irregular attendance or shirking. In our framework, this
type of individual is a¯-worker.
11The model’s results remain the same if the heterogeneity refers to production costs.
12To make things simple and without consequences on our results we assume that the costs of organization
are exogenous and independent of the level of wages.
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with e(a¯, j) (respectively e(a, j)) the effort level of an autonomous worker (respectively non
autonomous worker) inside an organization j. Given the results of Lemma 1, the expected
profit of a firm under each organization type is :
piW = q
s
t e¯+ (1− qst )e− cW
piF = q
s
t e+ (1− qst )e¯− cF (3)
Further we will assume that :
cW − cF < e¯− e (4)
The proportion of firms choosing theWorkshop organization at date t is noted pt (respectively
(1− pt) for the Factory).
Lemma 2 Given a proportion qt of autonomous workers at date t, the proportion pt+1 of
firms choosing the Workshop organization for the date t+ 1 is :
pt+1 =

0 if qt < q˜ − ε˜
1
2
− q˜
2ε˜
+ qt
2ε˜
if qt ∈ [q˜ − ε˜, q˜ + ε˜]
1 if qt > q˜ + ε˜
(5)
With q˜ = cW−cF
2(e¯−e) +
1
2
. Condition (3) ensures that q˜ is between 0 and 1.
Proof piW ≥ piF if qst ≥ q˜. Then if a firm perceives a proportion of autonomous workers
higher than the threshold q˜ it will choose the Workshop. The proportion of firms having a
signal qst higher than q˜ is :
pt+1 = P (q
s
t ≥ q˜) = P (ε ≥ q˜ − qt) =
∫ ε˜
q˜−qt
f(ε)dε =
ε˜− q˜ + qt
2ε˜
The result of Lemma 2 directly follows. ¤
The population of firms is totally homogeneous only for a relatively low level of imperfect
information (ε˜ low) and for a relatively homogeneous workers population. If qt ∈ [q˜− ε˜, q˜+ ε˜],
the population of firms is heterogenous.
2.1.3 Transmission of preferences
The individual preferences are acquired during childhood by a process of socialization. First
a process of vertical (parental) socialization occurs. In line with Bisin & Verdier (2001), we
assume that parents have a paternalistic form of altruism for their children. They make their
educational choices in order to maximize the well-being of their children, but this well-being
is evaluated according to their preferences. This assumption implies that parents always try
to socialize their children to their own preferences. We will note τ i the educational effort
made by a parent i , with i ∈ {a¯, a} the parental preferences. With probability τ i the vertical
socialization is successful and the child will adopt his parent’s preferences. With probability
1−τ i the vertical socialization fails and a process of oblique socialization begins. This oblique
socialization consists in the adoption, by the children, of another adult’s preferences, this
role model being randomly chosen among the population. Therefore, if vertical socialization
fails, a child, whatever his parent’s type, will be a¯ with probability qt and a with probability
1− qt.
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We can deduce from this socialization process the probability that a child of a parent with
preferences i is socialized to preferences j for each i and j . We will note P ij this transition
probability:
P a¯a¯t = τ
a¯
t + (1− τ a¯t )qt P a¯at = (1− τ a¯t ) (1− qt)
P aat = τ
a
t + (1− τat ) (1− qt) P aa¯t = (1− τat )qt (6)
2.1.4 Parental socialization choice
As we have seen, the parents make their educational choices in order to maximize their
children’s utility, estimated in accordance with their own preferences (the payoff matrix
corresponding to their type). Formally, the parental problem of socialization at date t can
be written as follows:
Max
τit
P iit (τ
i
t , qt)V
ii
t+1 + P
ij
t (τ
i
t , qt)V
ij
t+1 − C(τ it ) (7)
where V ijt+1 is the utility of a parent with preferences i if his child is of type j . It is the utility
of an individual behaving at the date t+1 according to the preferences j but evaluated
according to the preferences i . C(τ it ) is the socialization cost which we assume to be :
C(τ it ) =
(τ it )
2
2k
. The first order conditions yield:13
τ a¯t = k(1− qt)∆V a¯t+1 and τat = kqt∆V at+1 (8)
where ∆V it+1 = V iit+1 − V ijt+1. by definition ∆V it+1 is never negative. Indeed, the optimal
action of an agent of type j induces utility for an agent of type i lower or equal to the one
his own optimal action would have induced, thus V iit+1 ≥ V ijt+1. ∆V it+1 is the loss of utility
suffered by an agent of type i if he behaves like an agent of type j instead of optimally.
Besides, this value depends on the work organization at the date t+1 and therefore on the
expectations concerning the organization. Note ∆V i(W ) (respectively ∆V i(F )) this value
for an agent of type i expecting that his child will work inside the Workshop (respectively
Factory) organization.
If the organization is the Workshop, the a¯-workers will choose the level of effort e¯ and the
a-workers will choose the level of effort e. V a¯a(W ) is the payoff for a worker behaving like
an a-worker (choosing the level of effort e) evaluated with the payoff matrix for an a¯-worker.
Then we have V a¯a(W ) = (1−s)wW . In the same way, the following values for ∆V i regarding
the expected organization are deduced:
∆V a¯(W ) = swW ∆V
a(W ) = d− swW
∆V a¯(F ) = D − s¯wF ∆V a(F ) = s¯wF − d (9)
Finally, workers know the decision rule of the firm and then know the proportion pt+1 of
firms choosing the Workshop, then :
∆V it+1 = pt+1∆V
i(W ) + (1− pt+1)∆V i(F ) (10)
13Note that k must be low enough such that C(τ i) be sufficiently convex so that the solution of the
socialization problem is τ i < 1.
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Note that vertical and oblique transmissions are substitutes. The probability of transmission
of autonomy by oblique socialization is positively related to the proportion of autonomous
workers. The higher this proportion is, the weaker are the incentives for autonomous parents
to transmit their preferences directly and the higher are these incentives for non-autonomous
parents.14
The short-run equilibrium: firm’s choice (organization type) and workers’ choice (work
and education effort level for each worker type)15, has been characterized. Those choices
completely depend on the proportion of autonomous workers. So, the dynamics of the
economy are completely described by the dynamics of qt.
2.2 Dynamics of autonomy
We deduce from the transition probabilities given by (6) the dynamics of qt :
qt+1 = qtP
a¯a¯
t + (1− qt)P aa¯t = qt + qt(1− qt)[τ a¯t − τat ] (11)
The dynamics relationship qt+1 = f(qt) is derived by substitution of the optimal level of
socialization effort (8), the values of ∆V it+1 (9) and (10) and the value of pt+1 (5) into
expression (11):
f(qt) =

fF (qt) ≡ qt + qt(1− qt)k[D − s¯wF − qt(D − d)] if qt < q˜ − ε˜
fm(qt) if qt ∈ [q˜ − ε˜, q˜ + ε˜]
fW (qt) ≡ qt + qt(1− qt)k[swW − dqt] if qt > q˜ + ε˜
(12)
where
fm(qt) ≡ qt + qt(1− qt)kR(qt)
and
R(qt) = qt(D − 2d)(1
2
− q˜
2ε˜
+
qt
2ε˜
) + [s¯wF + swW −D](1
2
− q˜
2ε˜
+
qt
2ε˜
)
−qt(D − d) +D − s¯wF
The dynamics of qt can be split in three parts. For values of qt < q˜ − ε˜ all firms choose the
Factory, ∆ V it+1 = ∆V i(F ) for all agents and qt+1 = fF (qt). If qt > q˜+ e˜ all firms choose the
Workshop, ∆ V it+1 = ∆V i(W ) for all agents and qt+1 = fW (qt). Finally for q˜− ε˜ ≤ qt ≤ q˜+ ε˜
a proportion pt+1 of firms choose the Workshop, ∆V it+1 = pt+1∆V i(W ) + (1− pt+1)∆V i(F )
and qt+1 = fm(qt).
The following Lemma examines the general properties of the trajectories fF (qt) and
fW (qt).
Lemma 3 Both trajectories qt+1 = fW (qt) and qt+1 = fF (qt) have three stationary states:
0, 1 and qˆj = ∆V
a¯(j)
∆V a(j)+∆V a¯(j)
with j = {W,F}. Moreover, {0, 1} are unstable and for a low
enough k, qˆj is globally stable for both trajectories.
14This property is named cultural substitution by Bisin & Verdier (2001)
15We note respectively ea¯t and e
a
t the work effort level of a¯-workers and a-workers and τ a¯t and τ
a
t the
education effort level of a¯-workers and a-workers.
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Proof See Appendix ¤
By Lemma 3 the interior steady states values of qt corresponding to each trajectory
qt+1 = f
W (qt) and qt+1 = fF (qt) are qˆW = swWd and qˆ
F = D−s¯wF
D−d . Observe that qˆW > qˆF
when
D <
d(s¯wF − swW )
d− swW (13)
(13) holds under the sufficient condition that the loss of utility for an autonomous parent
(respectively for a non-autonomous parents) induced by having a child with different pref-
erences increases in the proportion of Workshop (respectively the proportion of Factory).16
Let us look at the general properties of the whole dynamics qt+1 = f(qt).
Lemma 4 Assume (1) holds. For a small enough k, f(qt) is continuous and strictly in-
creasing on between 0 and 1. Moreover, {0, 1} are unstable equilibria of qt+1 = f(qt) for all
parameter configurations.
Proof See Appendix ¤
Taking the historical example of the Industrial Revolution, the following section studies
the long-run behavior of the economy (preference distribution and industrial structure at
the steady state) regarding different configurations of parameters.
2.3 The Industrial Revolution: rise of the Factory and decline in
the autonomy
This section describes the consequences of a technological shock affecting the relative cost
of each form of organization on the dynamics. These consequences are illustrated by the
example of Industrial Revolution.
2.3.1 Pre-industrial situation
Clark (1994) focuses on the work conditions before the Industrial Revolution in Britain. He
argues that most workers were employed in Workshops, controlled their pace, timing and
conduct at work. The owner of the Workshop often rented out his material to workers without
exercising any control or discipline. Clark notes that: “workers worked when they wished
during [the Workshop opened] hours [...] workers did not have to produce any minimum
output per week”.
For a sufficiently low cost of Workshop organization (cW ), the dynamics of qt exhibit a
unique steady state corresponding to the situation described by Clark. It is the case in the
configuration, illustrated by Figure 1, where q˜ − ε˜ < qˆF and q˜ + ε˜ < qˆW .
Proposition 1 describes the properties of the dynamics in this configuration of parameters
and under the additional assumption (14)17
D < 2d (14)
16Indeed, ∂∆V
i
t+1
∂pt+1
= ∆V i(W )−∆V i(F ) and (13) holds if ∆V a¯(W )∆V a(F ) > ∆V a¯(F )∆V a(W ).
17This technical assumption means that the disutility of autonomous workers inside the Factory is not too
large relative to the disutility of non autonomous worker. It is not necessary to obtain our results. However
it allows us to specify the dynamics in all parameter configurations.
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01
qt
qt+1
q˜ − ε˜ 1qˆF qˆWq˜ + ε˜
Fig. 1. Dynamics of the worker’s distribution of preferences when q˜ − ε˜ < qˆF < q˜ + ε˜ < qˆW
Proposition 1 Assume (1), (13) and (14) hold. If q˜ − ε˜ < qˆF < q˜ + ε˜ < qˆW : {0, 1} are
unstable steady states and for all q0 ∈]0, 1[, qt converges toward qˆW .
Proof See Appendix ¤
By Proposition 1, for all initial proportions of autonomous workers, the economy will
converge toward qˆW characterized by a relatively high level of autonomy and the choice of
the Workshop organization by all the firms. This result comes from the interplay of the
organizational choices and the incentives of parents to educate their children. For low values
of qt (qt < q˜− ε˜), all firms choose the Factory organization. Despite this, autonomous agents
transmit their preferences more than non-autonomous because of the cultural substitution.
Then the proportion of autonomous workers rises. This increase of qt induces an increase
of pt (the proportion of Workshops) which, in turn, implies a rise of incentives to transmit
autonomy. As qt increases and the autonomous workers become the majority, this positive
incentives effect dominates the negative effect of cultural substitution. Finally, qt converges
to the stable value qˆW .
The equilibrium qˆW corresponds to the pre-Industrial Revolution situation as described
by Clark. The next part examines how technological changes, at the origin of the Industrial
Revolution, may destabilize this equilibrium.
2.3.2 The Industrial revolution
The steam machine has been the emblematic innovation of the first Industrial Revolution.
It allowed employer to supply many workers with energy under the same roof. Then it lead
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to the division of labor and the birth of the Factory. Mokyr (2001) insists on another deter-
minant of transition toward the Factory: the decrease in costs of the centralized production
(essentially the transport costs) relatively to the costs of the decentralized production (es-
sentially the information diffusion costs). Indeed, the improvement of the means of transport
enabled the firm to access a larger market and a cheaper input supply. Such changes have
the door to mass-production and to a new organizational form able to sustain this huge
increase of production.18
The technical changes at the origin of the Industrial Revolution are represented, in the
model, by a decrease in the costs of Factory organization relative to Workshop organization
(rise of cW − cF ). It implies a rise of q˜ and then a shift toward the right of the interval
[q˜− ε˜, q˜+ ε˜]. Starting from the situation of Figure 1 consider a shock provoking an increase
of q˜ such that the bound q˜ + ε˜ overtakes qˆW .
Proposition 2 Assume (1), (13) and (14) hold. If q˜ − ε˜ < qˆF < qˆW < q˜ + ε˜: {0, 1} are
unstable steady states and for all q0 ∈] 0, 1 [ , qt converges toward qˆm.
Proof See Appendix ¤
Figure 2 (Cf. section 3.1) illustrates the results of Proposition 2. The trajectories outside
the interval [q˜− ε˜, q˜+ ε˜] (qt+1 = fF (qt) for qt < q˜− ε˜ and qt+1 = fW (qt) for qt > q˜+ ε˜) remain
unchanged. But the trajectory qt+1 = fm(qt), which holds between the bounds q˜− ε˜ and q˜+ ε˜
is modified. Indeed, the shock induces a cost advantage to the Factory. Given a proportion
of autonomous workers qˆW , due to this cost advantage, a proportion (1−pt) = 12+ q˜2ε˜− qˆ
W
2ε˜
of
firms shifts from the Workshop to the Factory organization. This appearance of a coercive
form of production decreases the parental incentives to transmit autonomy and thus decreases
the proportion of autonomous workers for the next date (qt+1 = fm(qˆW ) < qˆW by Proposition
2). This decline in the proportion of autonomous workers strengthens the advantage of the
Factory. Finally, the proportion of autonomous workers and the proportion of Workshops
will progressively decrease to reach respectively qˆm and pˆm = 1
2
− q˜
2ε˜
+ qˆ
m
2ε˜
.19
Note that the model does not predict an unconditional organizational change after a
technological shock in favor of the Factory. Such a shock must be large enough to make
q˜ + ε˜ higher than qˆW . Then, the initial proportion of autonomous workers (qˆW ) determines
whether a given technological shock will provoke a spread of the Factory. Berg (1985)
highlights this dependence on the adoption of the Factory for the structure of preferences.20
The impact of Factory discipline on workers’ behavior or preferences is more difficult
to assess. Taira (1978) notes that an industrial revolution simultaneous to the rise of the
Factory system induces a potential transformation of “traditional man into industrial man,
as he sheds the traditional outlook and works habits and acquires new personal qualities that
18See Chandler (1978) and Taira (1978) for historical study of transformations linked with the Industrial
Revolution respectively in the United States and in Japan.
19The result, according to which the Industrial Revolution introduced a new form of production orga-
nization without inducing a disappearance of the traditional organization (Workshop, handcraft...) seems
empirically relevant (see Berg (1985) and Taira (1978) for the English and Japanese examples).
20He argues that : “the choice of economic structures were partly dependent on the social values of domestic
workers and artisans. The strength of such values reverberated in the resistance of the factories and to
mechanization, ultimately determining the location of much factory-based industry”.
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enable him to manoeuvre rationally in the class structure of an industrial society”. The
impact of job conditions on personality is also highlighted in empirical studies on individual
data. Indeed, there is a cumulative body of evidence that people who do self-directed work
highly value self-direction, both for themselves and for their children (Kohn & Schooler
(1978) and (1981); Miller et al. (1979) and (1985)). At an aggregated level, all these findings
imply that the rise of the Factory should be followed by the fall of autonomy. In the model,
the preferences of workers do not change during the work life shaped by work conditions.
The decrease of autonomy comes from the relative advantage acquired by non autonomous
behaviors in the process of preference transmission because of the appearance of the Factory.
3 Path dependency and organizational differentiation
The previous section dealt with the impact of cost shocks on the long run distribution
of preferences via the move of the threshold q˜. Now, this section focuses on the long run
impact of a change in the variables that influence workers’ utility (for instance a wage shock).
Finally, we model a combination of these two types of shock and introduce the possibility of
path dependency in organizational trajectories.
3.1 Incentives effect of wages and supervision
Consider the consequences of an asymmetric evolution of wages between the two organiza-
tions.21 Assume that the wage associated with the Factory organization (wF ) increases while
the wage associated with the Workshop organization (wW ) remains stable. The equilibria qˆF
and qˆm are decreasing with respect to wF .22 Indeed, a rise of wF allows for a higher increase
in the expected reward for a non-shirker (equal to wF ) than for a shirker (equal to (1− s¯)wF ).
By Lemma 1, if the organizational form is the Factory, autonomous workers choose the high
level of effort (e¯) and non-autonomous workers the low level. Then, an increase in wF has
a larger positive influence on the expected utility of a non-autonomous worker than on the
expected utility of an autonomous worker. That induces a fall of the relative incentive to
transmit autonomy. So, the long run proportion of autonomous workers decreases.
The following figures represent the change in the dynamics induced by the rise of wF .23
Start from the equilibrium qˆm (left figure). If the decrease of qˆF is large enough such that
qˆF < q˜ − ε˜, it will generate a shift toward the equilibrium qˆF .
21On the asymmetric evolution of American wages between Workshop and Factory see Atack et al. (2004)
on the period 1850-1880 and Goldin & Katz (1996) for data on the beginning of the twentieth century.
22qˆm is decreasing with respect to wF because R′′(q) < 0 and
∂R(q)
∂wF
= s¯(pt+1 − 1) < 0.
23Note that the increase of labor productivity at the origin of the increase of wF can induce an increase in
the relative profit of the Factory organization and thus an increase of q˜. We choose not to take into account
this effect which is without qualitative consequences on our results.
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Fig. 3. Dynamics of qt when qˆF < q˜− ε˜ < qˆW < q˜+ ε˜
Proposition 3 Assume (1), (13) and (14) hold. If qˆF < q˜ − ε˜ < qˆW < q˜ + ε˜: {0, 1} are
unstable steady states and for all q0 ∈] 0, 1 [ , qt converges toward qˆF .
Proof See Appendix ¤
Consider qˆm as the initial situation. As a result of the shock, the proportion of au-
tonomous workers will progressively decrease to reach qˆF . At the same time, the proportion
of Factories within the firms’ population increases and reaches one in the long run. An
increase of s¯ induces the same effects as the increase of wF .
Notice that these changes do not arise from an intrinsic advantage in the efficiency of
Factory organization. Here, it is the transformation of the preferences structure (i.e. the
decline in the autonomy) which induces the higher profitability of the Factory. Thus, the
key factor at the origin of the disappearance of the Workshop organization is the decline in
incentives to transmit autonomy.
Moreover, the fall of qt implies a decrease of the proportion of shirkers inside the Factory.
This result complies with the standard incentive theory: the average level of effort inside the
Factory rises with the wages and the supervision level. However, the mechanism at play is
different here. This increase does not come from a rise of incentives to provide effort. It is
allowed by the rise of incentives to transmit the non-autonomous behavior.
3.2 Organizational path dependency
Section 3.3.2. emphasizes the consequences of a technological shock (shock on the relative
cost of each organization) on the dynamics of qt. These consequences depend in a crucial way
on the current distribution of preferences. The previous section showed that a shock affecting
the workers’ utility (such as a change in wages or in the level of supervision) modifies the
incentives to transmit autonomy. Thus, it has an impact on the steady state reached by the
economy. Now, we consider the consequences of the combination of these two types of shock.
Starting from Figure 3, let us assume a cost shock in favor of Workshop organization
(fall of cW − cF ). It implies a decrease of q˜ (the level of imperfect information ε˜ remaining
unchanged). The consequences for the dynamics of qt are summarized in Proposition 4.
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Proposition 4 Assume (1), (13) and (14) hold. If qˆF < q˜ − ε˜ < q˜ + ε˜ < qˆW are unstable
steady states and qˆF and qˆW are stable steady states such that:
− for all q0 ∈]0, qˆm′ [, qt converges to qˆF
− for all q0 ∈ [qˆm′ , 1], qt converges to qˆW where qˆm′ solves the equation R(q) = 0.
Proof See Appendix ¤
The results of the proposition are illustrated in the following figure.
0
1
qt
qt+1
qˆm
′
1
q˜ − ε˜
qˆF qˆW
q˜ + ε˜
Fig. 4. Dynamics of qt when qˆF < q˜ − ε˜ < q˜ + ε˜ < qˆW
In this case the long-run equilibrium reached by the economy depends on the initial
distribution of preferences (q0). This initial distribution is the proportion of autonomous
workers before the shock. It depends on the nature and the timing of the previous shocks.
Consider again the shock described in Figure 3. The increase of wF induces a transition
from qˆm to qˆF . Then, at date T a second shock occurs which corresponds to a fall of cW −cF
(Figure 4). The long run equilibrium will depend on the timing of these two consecutive
shocks. Indeed, assume that the second shock is relatively close to the first one, that is to say
qT is still higher than qˆm
′ . In this case, the economy will converge toward qˆW . Conversely,
if the shock takes place later, such that qT < qˆm
′ , the economy will pursue its convergence
toward qˆF .
The Figure 5 describes the population dynamics of two economies ((a) and (b)) impacted
by the same shocks but at a different date. For the simulation, parameters are chosen such
that before the first shock, qˆW = 0.7, qˆF = 0.4, qˆm ' 0.64, q˜ = 0.55 and ε˜ = 0.2. This
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configuration of parameters corresponds to the situation of Figure 2 where the only steady
state is qˆm. Both economies are initially in qˆm. wF increases by 10 % (shock 1), first, in
economy (a) at date t = 2 and then in economy (b) at date t = 4. After this shock, the
new value of qˆF is 0.2. Then, at date t = 6, within the two economies, the relative cost of
Workshop (cW − cF ) decreases (shock 2) and q˜ equals to 0.45.24
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(a) Shock 1 (t = 2) and Shock 2 (t = 6)
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(b) Shock 1 (t = 4) and Shock 2 (t = 6)
Fig. 5. Evolution of the proportion of autonomous workers (Shock 1: increase of the Factory wages, Shock
2: decrease of the relative cost of Workshop)
Because the first shocks are two-periods lagged, it induces a striking divergence in terms
of both the long-run level of autonomy and the organizational form. This comes from the
fact that the earlier the shock, the larger the decrease of autonomy. Besides, an important
decrease of autonomy makes the adoption of Workshop organization non-profitable even
after the fall of cW − cF . Thus, via the impact of organizational choices on preferences
distribution, the trajectory of an economy is path dependent. The timing of the evolution
of a productive system determines the possibilities of the adoption of an alternative system.
In the following discussion, we will see how these properties can help us to understand the
different organizational development in Japan and the U.S. during the twentieth century.
3.3 Discussion
Both in Japan and the U.S. the spread of the Factory system followed the Industrial Rev-
olution. Piore & Sabel (1984) highlight, for the U.S., this phenomenon of disappearance of
the Workshop organization to the benefit of mass-production and the Factory organization.
Nevertheless, during the second part of the twentieth century, Japan broke away from this
trend and adopted a more flexible form of production. Several authors argue that a techno-
logical shock in favor of a more flexible and decentralized form of organization could be at
the origin of this shift. For instance, Milgrom & Roberts (1990) insist on the impact of the
development of computer science and robotics, Mokyr (2001) focuses on the decrease of in-
formation costs, Lindbeck & Snower (2000) summarize evidence on cost advantages acquired
by a less centralized form of organization. This shock has induced the appearance of new
24The values of parameters are chosen to satisfy the conditions (1), (4), (13) and (14). Moreover, the
wages payed inside the Workshop and the Factory are assumed to be the same (wW = wF ) before the first
shock.
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management style and organizational forms, such as the lean production principles (Womak
et al. (1991)), in Japan. It impacted the whole developed world and is represented in our
framework by a decrease in q˜ (through the reduction of cW − cF ). The question is, why has
such a shock induced a deeper and earlier change of organizational form in Japan than in
the U.S.?
Complying with the analysis presented in the previous section, the later industrialization
of Japan could be at the origin of these national divergences. Chandler (1969) stresses the
earlier and faster spread of mass-production in the U.S. than in Japan. This spread came
with an increase in the division of labor, in labor productivity and in wages. In the model,
these changes are represented by the first shock (increase of wF or/and increase of s¯). The
model predicts that the later industrialization of Japan combined with the technological
shock in favor of more decentralized forms of production will induce not only divergences in
the production pattern but also in the proportion of autonomous workers (Figure 5).
Consequently, the conservation of a sufficient cultural heterogeneity due to a later indus-
trialization allowed for the rise of a new and more flexible organizational form in Japan.25
This historical path dependency provides one explanation for the international differences
in organizational trajectories without having recourse to strict cultural explanations (Dore
(1973), Lincoln & Kalleberg (1990)).
4 Extensions
In this section two assumptions are modified. First, the firms do not make their organiza-
tional choices for the date t at the end of date t−1 but at the beginning of date t . Thus, this
choice is a function of qt. Consequently, the socialization decision of parents for the date t
depends on the expectation on the proportion of autonomous workers for the date t+1. This
expectation is denoted qat+1. The second assumption to be modified concerns the imperfec-
tion of information. In the following, at date t , firms perfectly observe the proportion qt of
autonomous workers.26 Under these new assumptions, this section gives a role to ideology in
the switch from one equilibrium to another. In the second part, we propose a new modelling
of the relative cost of organization (cW − cF ) taking into account the possibilities of learning
and innovation.
4.1 Self-fulfilling beliefs and the role of ideology
Under the new assumptions, the optimal effort choices of workers are not modified (Lemma
1 still holds). The optimal organizational choice of the firm is the Workshop if qt < q˜ and
the Factory if qt ≥ q˜. Finally, the optimal socialization choice of parents is:
τ a¯t = k(1− qt)∆V a¯t+1 =
{
k(1− qt)sw if qat+1 > q˜
k(1− qt)(D − s¯w) if qat+1 ≤ q˜ (15)
25Veblen (1934) was the first to apply to Japan the idea that the timing of a nation’s industrialization
impacts on the nature of its subsequent growth and institutional structure.
26This assumption, which prevents the possibility of co-existence of the two organizations at the same
date, simplifies the resolution without changing the results of this section.
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τat = kqt∆V
a
t+1 =
{
kqt(d− sw) if qat+1 > q˜
kqt(s¯w − d) if qat+1 ≤ q˜ (16)
The dynamics of the economy become qt+1 = f(qt, qat+1), where
f(qt, q
a
t+1) =
{
fF (qt) ≡ qt + qt(1− qt)k[D − s¯w − qt(D − d)] if qat+1 ≤ q˜
fW (qt) ≡ qt + qt(1− qt)k[sw − dqt] if qat+1 > q˜ (17)
The trajectory of the economy is totally determined by the sequence of qt and qat+1.
Among these trajectories we will only focus on the perfect foresight paths. A perfect foresight
path is defined as a sequence of qt satisfying equation (17) and as qat+1 = qt+1 for all t .
The dynamics of qt, given by the equation qt+1 = f(qt, qt+1), completely describe the
evolution of our economy under the assumption of perfect foresight. These dynamics are
composed of two trajectories, qt+1 = fF (qt) if the agents expect that all firms will choose the
Factory organization (qat+1 ≤ q˜) and qt+1 = fW (qt) if the agents expect that qat+1 > q˜. By the
assumption of perfect foresight paths, the agents’ expectations are self-fulfilling. qat+1 ≤ q˜
implies that qt+1 ≤ q˜ and the firms will effectively choose the Factory organization. The
properties of the two trajectories are described in Lemma 3.
The main difference regarding the previous sections is the presence of an indeterminacy
area. We define {q¯W , q¯F} ∈ [0, 1]2 as the values of q which solve respectively q˜ = fF (q) and
q˜ = fW (q). The following results hold
Proposition 5 If q¯F < qt < q¯W , two values of qt+1 corresponding to a perfect foresight path
exist.
Proof See Appendix ¤
Figure 6 describes the dynamics in the configuration where q¯F < qˆF < q˜ < qˆW < q¯W
(The perfect foresight paths are represented by the solid line).
If qt+1 > q˜ (respectively qt+1 ≤ q˜) the only perfect foresight path corresponds to the
trajectory fW (qt) (respectively fF (qt)). As the two equilibria qˆW and qˆF are stable, if q0 > q˜
all the firms initially choose the Workshop and, if the expectations remain the same (workers
continue to believe that the Workshop will be the future form of organization) the economy
converges toward qˆW . However, the equilibria qˆW and qˆF are both in the indetermination
area [q¯F , q¯W ].
If the economy is on equilibrium qˆW (respectively qˆF ), the expectation that the firms
will choose the Factory (respectively the Workshop) organization is self-fulfilling. Thus if
parents focus their expectations on the Factory (respectively the Workshop) qt will join
qˆF (respectively qˆW ). Hence, qˆW and qˆF are steady states but are unstable according to
expectations. Consequently, the long-run organization and distribution of preferences would
be affected by a change in agents’ anticipations.
Bisin & Verdier (2000) insist on the role of ideologies in the coordination of beliefs. Indeed
an ideology, providing to agents an image of what should be the state of a future society,
allows them to coordinate their behavior, based on one anticipation. Obviously, to provoke
a switch from one equilibrium to another, the ideology has to be self-fulfilling. It is the case
of the belief of industrialization if the economy is in qˆW . In this case, if a sufficiently large
proportion of parents believes that the Factory will prevail over the future society, they will
19
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Fig. 6. Dynamics of qt when q¯F < qˆF < q˜ < qˆW < q¯W .
expect that the behavior of non autonomous workers will be relatively less rewarded. The
preference for autonomy will be less transmitted and the proportion qt+1 will be effectively
lower than q˜.
Luke (1983), in a study concerning Soviet Russia, argues that the Russian industrial-
ization has required the transformation of the cultural values of the work force. He insists
on the culture-transforming role of Marxist ideology in the development of a modern work
ethic, based on disciplined labor.27 Our framework allows us to consider the possibility of a
transition toward another form of organization allowed by ideology.
4.2 Learning and innovation
Up to now, the two organizations differed by the incentives they provide to the workers
and an exogenous cost parameter. This section introduces another difference: the level of
workers’ involvement in the process of learning and innovation. It allows us to take into
account the role of autonomy in the innovative process. For this, we modify the model,
introducing the following assumptions
i The innovations of a date t allow a decrease of production costs for the following period,
27One of the roles given by Lenin to the communist party cadres was to spread within the Russian people
discipline as both a value and a necessity to reach a new society. Their mission was “to teach people how to
work” and to lead the struggle against “carelessness, untidiness, unpunctuality, nervous haste, the inclination
to substitute discussion for action” (Lenin (1964)[1918] and Lenin (1965)[1919]).
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ii these improvements are spread in the whole economy but are specific to an organiza-
tional form,
iii the process of learning and innovation can only take place in the Workshop organiza-
tion,
iv only autonomous workers are able to propose improvements in the production process.
Though iii, the process of learning and innovation can only take place in an organization
characterized by a sufficiently flexible form of organization. Indeed, a high level of workers’
involvement, multitasking or decentralization of authority may facilitate this process. This
assumption is supported by the findings of Laursen & Foss (2003), who emphasize the positive
effect of organization decentralization on innovative performances. Assumption iv means
that a sufficient level of autonomy is required to benefit from learning possibilities and to be
able to propose innovations.
Under these four assumptions we can express the cost of the Workshop organization at
date t as a function of the proportion of autonomous workers at date t − 1. It is denoted
CW (qt−1, ν) = cW − l(qt−1, ν) with ν a technological factor and l the function describing the
learning efficiency. We assume l(0, ν) = 0 and
∂l(qt−1, ν)
∂qt−1
> 0,
∂l(qt−1, ν)
∂ν
> 0,
∂2l(qt−1, ν)
∂(qt−1)2
< 0 and
∂2l(qt−1, ν)
∂qt−1∂ν
> 0
The optimal effort choice of workers is not modified (Lemma 1 still holds). The threshold q˜
is now a function of the previous proportion of autonomous workers
q˜(qt−1, ν) =
cW − cF − l(qt−1, ν)
2(e¯− e) +
1
2
(18)
Here, a technological change can take two different forms. First, it can directly affect
the relative cost of production (change in (cW − cF )). Secondly, it can modify the efficiency
of learning (change of ν). The Figure 7. describes the consequences of an increase in the
technological factor from ν to ν ′.
For all proportions of autonomous workers, an improvement of the learning process im-
plies a decrease of the costs of Workshop organization. Let us start from the equilibrium qˆF .
As illustrated in Figure 7, if this improvement is large enough, it is sufficient to destabilize
the equilibrium qˆF and to provoke the convergence toward qˆW .
This modelling gives a better description of the return to a more flexible form of or-
ganization during the last decades. Indeed, many innovations associated with the rise of
new organizational forms give higher importance to continuous learning and to the worker’s
autonomy in the innovative process. For instance, Lindbeck & Snower (2000) insist on the
role of the intertask learning . It arises when a worker can use the information and skills
acquired at one task to improve his performance and to propose innovations concerning other
tasks. This form of learning, allowed by the introduction of robotic and flexible machine
tools, may be easier and more spontaneous for autonomous workers. The profitability of the
implementation of Information Technologies also rises with the level of workers’ reactivity
and adaptability. These technological changes, increasing the role of autonomy in the im-
provement of the production process, may induce a shift toward a new situation, according
more importance to autonomy.
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Fig. 7. Change in the dynamics of qt following an increase of ν
5 Conclusion
The introduction of an heterogeneity in the workers’ preferences enables us to show how
the work organization and the preferences distribution could be co-determined. On the one
hand, the proportion of autonomous workers impacts on the relative profitability of different
organizational forms and thus on the form chosen by the firms. On the other hand, the work
organization determines the reward of autonomy and thus parents’ incentives to transmit
this trait. Hence, economic factors, such as the technological level, will determine the long
run organizational and cultural structure of a society. For instance, the fall of transport costs
and the innovations wave induced by the Industrial Revolution implied both the spread of
the Factory and a decrease in autonomy among the workers. Other factors, such as the level
of wages or the level of supervision in the Factory, impact on the incentives for parents to
transmit autonomy. The combination of both shocks on organizational costs and on wages
may induce the phenomenon of path dependency. In particular, the delay in industrialization
or in technological change can allow for an easier adoption of organizational innovations.
Indeed, in a country where technological progress has not induce the domination of one
organizational form, the heterogeneity in preferences of the workers remains relatively high.
It is this cultural diversity which make profitable the adoption of new forms of organizations.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 3.
It is easy to see that 0, 1 and qˆj are solutions of the equation f j(qt) = qt with j ∈ {W,F}.
We note that df j(qt)/dqt|qt=0 = 1 + k∆V a¯(j)>1 and df j(qt)/dqt|qt=1 = 1 + k∆V a(j) > 1
therefore (0,1) are locally unstable. Moreover, the functions f j(qt), describing evolution of
qt on the trajectory (j), are continuous and increasing if k is low enough. This implies that
the unique interior solution qˆj for each trajectory (j) is globally stable.
Proof of Lemma 4.
We check the continuity of f :
lim
x→q˜−ε˜
fF (x) = fm(q˜ − ε˜) and lim
x→q˜+ε˜
fW (x) = fm(q˜ + ε˜)
By Lemma 3 fF (qt) and fW (qt) are increasing. Moreover, we have fm(q) = q + q(1 −
q)kR(q), then :
∂fm(q)
∂q
= 1 + k(1− 2q)R(q) + kq(1− q)R′(q)
which is positive for low enough k . Then, for low enough k , f(qt) is increasing between 0
and 1.
It is easy to see that 0 and 1 are equilibria of the dynamics qt+1 = f(qt). We check
whether these equilibria are stable :
− if q˜ − ε˜ > 0 : f(0) = fF (0) and, by Lemma 3, 0 is unstable;
− if q˜− ε˜ ≤ 0 : f(0) = fm(0) and dfm(q)/dq|q=0 = 1+kR(0) = 1+k(D− s¯wF )
(
1
2
+ q˜
2ε˜
)
+
swW
(
1
2
− q˜
2ε˜
)
> 1 for low enough k ;
− if q˜ + ε˜ < 1 : f(1) = fW (1) and, by Lemma 3, 1 is unstable;
− if q˜ + ε˜ ≥ 1 : f(1) = fm(1) and df(x)/dx|x=1 = 1− kR(1) = 1 + k(d− swW )
(
1−q˜
ε˜
)
+
(s¯wF − swW )
(
q˜+ε˜−1
2ε˜
)
> 1 for low enough k .
Then 0 and 1 are always unstable equilibria of qt+1 = f(qt).
Proof of Proposition 1.
Let us look at the equilibria on the set I =]0, q˜ − ε˜[∪]q˜ + ε˜, 1[= I1 ∪ I2. We know that fF
holds on I1 and fW holds on I2. By Lemma 3, If q˜ − ε˜ < qˆF and q˜ + ε˜ < qˆW : qˆW is the
unique steady states of qt+1 = f(qt) on I .
On the interval J = [q˜ − ε˜, q˜ + ε˜], fm holds. The equation fm(q) = q − q(1− q)R(q) = q
has for solution 0, 1 and the solutions of the equation R(q) = 0. Moreover, R′′(q) = D−2d
ε˜
then the condition D < 2d ensures the global concavity of R(q). q˜ − ε˜ < qˆF implies that
R(q˜ − ε˜) > 0 and q˜ + ε˜ < qˆW implies that R(q˜ + ε˜) > 0. Then, by global concavity of R(q),
the equation R(q) = 0 has no solution.
The results directly follow from the continuity and the increase of f(q) proved in Lemma
4.
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Proof of Proposition 2.
By Lemma 3 q˜ − ε˜ < qˆF and q˜ + ε˜ > qˆW implies that qt+1 = f(qt) has no steady state on I
(defined in the proof of Proposition 1).
On the interval J = [q˜ − ε˜, q˜ + ε˜], fm holds. q˜ − ε˜ < qˆF implies that R(q˜ − ε˜) > 0 and
q˜ + ε˜ > qˆW implies that R(q˜ + ε˜) < 0. Then, by global concavity of R(q), the equation
R(q) = 0 has a unique solution. This solution is denoted qˆm. Moreover, for q < qˆm
(respectively q > qˆm), R(q) is positive (respectively negative) then fm(qt) > qt (respectively
fm(qt) < qt). Thus qˆm, the unique equilibrium of fm(qt) on J , is stable.
The results directly follow from the continuity and the increase of f(q) proved in Lemma
4.
Proof of Proposition 3.
By Lemma 3 q˜ − ε˜ > qˆF and q˜ + ε˜ > qˆW implies that qˆF is the unique steady states of
qt+1 = f(qt) on I (defined in the proof of Proposition 1).
On the interval J = [q˜ − ε˜, q˜ + ε˜], fm holds. q˜ − ε˜ > qˆF implies that R(q˜ − ε˜) < 0
and q˜ + ε˜ > qˆW implies that R(q˜ + ε˜) < 0. By global concavity of R(q), the value of q
corresponding to the maximum of R(q) is solution of the equation R′(q) = 0. Denote q˘ this
solution, we have q˘ =
1
2
D(1+ε˜+q˜)− 1
2
(s¯wF+swW )−dq˜
D−2d . Under the assumption D < 2d, q˘ 6∈ J then
R(q) does not reach it maximum on J . Finally the global concavity of R(q) ensures that the
equation R(q) = 0 has no solution on J .
The results directly follow from the continuity and the increase of f(q) proved in Lemma
4.
Proof of Proposition 4.
By Lemma 3 q˜ − ε˜ > qˆF and q˜ + ε˜ < qˆW implies that qˆW and qˆF are the two steady states
of qt+1 = f(qt) on I (defined in the proof of Proposition 1).
On the interval J = [q˜ − ε˜, q˜ + ε˜], fm holds. q˜ − ε˜ > qˆF implies that R(q˜ − ε˜) < 0 and
q˜+ ε˜ < qˆW implies that R(q˜+ ε˜) > 0 then, by global concavity of R(q), a unique solution as
R(q) = 0 exists. This solution is denoted qˆm′ . Moreover, for q < qˆm′ (respectively q > qˆm′),
R(q) is negative (respectively positive) then fm(qt) < qt (respectively fm(qt) > qt). Thus
qˆm
′ , the unique equilibrium of fm(qt) on J , is unstable.
The results directly follow from the continuity and the increase of f(q) proved in Lemma
4.
Proof of Proposition 5.
q¯F < qt < q¯
W and fF (q) and fW (q) are monotonically increasing functions implying that
fF (qt) < f
F (q¯W ) = q˜ and fW (qt) > fW (q¯F ) = q˜. If the agents expect that the firms will
choose the Factory organization for the date t + 1, qt+1 = fF (qt) < q˜ then the firms will
effectively choose the Factory. If the agents expected that the firms will choose the Workshop
organization for the date t + 1, qt+1 = fW (qt) > q˜ then the firms will effectively choose the
Workshop.
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